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I. INTRO DOCTION
Ihe structure of the United States government was
conceived during the eighteenth century and remains basi-
cally unchanged today- Since ficrld War II the ability of
this eighteenth century structure to respond to twentieth
century political prcrlems has increasingly seen called into
guestion. Ihe single greatest threat to tne United States is
the onslaught of world communism led b'j the Soviet Union.
Can the open, democratic government of the United States,
dependent cr compromise and consensus on a large scale,
compete with that of the Soviet Union, where compromise and
consensus have little meaning even in the Politburo?
American strategic planners need to take into account
the constraints on effective policy implementation engen-
dered by the structure and process of tladisonian democracy.
Ilanning done in ignorance of those constraints will have
little hope of successful execution.
Ihis thesis will explore these constraints, commencing
with an historical perspective of Soviet-American relations
as an illustration of the danger the United States faces.
This thesis will also examine the principle structural and
sociological constraints on planners and policymakers and
investigate of the national interest as a driving force in
American politics.
II. THE_ SET TING
Soviet- American relations since 1917 have been charac-
terized by fear, subdued hostility, and mutual suspicion.
Ihis ccmpetitive relationship is the fulcrum upon which
international politics turns.
It is an interesting historical coincidence that in 1917
toth the United States and Russia had leaders operating on
powerful ideological rases.
"There were even certain similarities in their respec-
tive points of view: both Wilson and Lenin believed in
the universal applicability of their philosophies of
government and in the inevitability ox their eventual
triumph; both sought to alter the traditional structure
of international relations in such a way to end imperi-
alism and war; both, in their way, looked to democracy
as the ultimate objective. But here the similarities
end. Where Lenin conceived of democracy only in economic
terms. Wilson tended to think of it primarily in polit-
ical terms; where lenin endorsed violent social revolu-
tion as the only means of attaining this goal, Wilson
favored evolution, cr
f
at most, controlled revolution
within a liberal-capitalist framework; where Lenin
sought to overthrow the existing international order,
Wilscn sought to alter it from within — to be in it rut
not of it." 1
Although the ideologies are strongly divergent and anta-
gonistic, they did net preclude some diplomatic and commer-
cial exchange. Lenin was a realist capable of allowing
short-term concessions to the capitalists to further advance
the long-term prospects for successful communism.
Throughout the 1920's the Soviet Union held out concessions
to capitalist countries which American businessmen
exploited. By 1930, 25% of Soviet imports were from the
United States. 2
*Gaddis, J.L., Eussia, The Soviet Union, and The United
States, (New York: TJiIeyT T"9T8]~pTB3
2Jbid., p. 103
Kilscn was a more inflexible ideologue than Lenin, and
at no pcint did he atandon his belief that Bolshevism was a
disease requiring extermination before it engulfed Europe.
The selection of means to effect this end was the only ques-
tion in his mind in this regard- There existed confusion as
to whether force or cooperation was the way to tame
Bolshevism. (This question has remained unanswered
throughout the subsequent decades.) On one hand, one can
look to the American participation in the Allied interven-
tions in Russia in 1S18, on. the other to the economic coop-
eration of the 1920 f s. Wilson believed that recognition of
the Soviet Union would lend legitimacy to the Bolsheviks.
Ihis recognition he was not willing to give. But he and his
successors were unable to come to a decision as to hew to
deal with the fledgling U.S.S.R. Given opportunities to
harass (and possibly even strangle) the newborn Soviet
Union, the United States did little to hurt her.
Tie United States policy towards the Soviet Union was
confused for several reasons. There was little fear of
Soviet power as such, but rather fear that Soviet communism
(it was frequently called anarchism at the time) set a
dangerous example in a war- weakened Europe. Simultaneously,
the Soviet Union represented irresistable business opportu-
nities for American industry. lenin welcomed American busi-
ness and knew the capitalist would be unable to resist the
short-term payoffs, regardless of long-term perils.
Additionally, America separated diplomatic and economic
relations in a way trey never were separated in the Soviet
Union. Ihroughout the 1920's, the United States was unable
to align its ideological aims with its business interests
and economic policies. 3
3lbid., p. 1 a- 1 5
The Soviet gcverniient suffered from a similar schi-
zophrenia during this period, which compounded American
confusion. The U.S.S.R. had two conflicting and competing
interests. Cn one hand Russia reguired a period of peace and
stability (internal acd international) to repair the tremen-
dous damage done by Wcrld War I and to solidify the new
regime in power. This reguired the establishment of cordial
business relationships with the West, for Western capital,
technical expertise, and finished goods were badly needed.
Marxism demanded industrialization, and this was a tall
crder in Soviet Russia, even without the destruction of
World War I.
On the ether hand international stability did nothing to
further the prospects of the world revolution. War was
necessary to destabilize the existing world order, pit the
capitalists/imperialists against each other, and generally
create opportunties fcr communism to rise up and establish
the new world order. Ihus the activities of the Comintern
were crucial to ideolcgical cohesion when faced with
conflicting interests. The mission of the Comintern was
very clear:
"The destruction by war of capitalist equilibrium
throughout the world creates favorable fighting condi-
tions for the forces of social revolution. All the
erfcrts of the Communist International were and are
designed to exploit this situation to the full."*
The existence and activity of the Comintern was a funda-
mental bene of contention between the United States and the
Soviet Union in the £cst World War I period and probably the
largest single barrier to the establishment of diplomatic
relations.
-„..„ ££^as i J ** ed. , The Communist International,
12iiZ-l!.y: documents, T:T97'9^7^:^w~YorK7~axfor3 University?ress, 155^77 p. 23B.
10
Iii spite of this, two factors brought a warming in this
relationship. One was the growing power of Germany and
Japan. The other was the accession of Franklin D. Roosevelt
to the presidency ic January 1933. Roosevelt favored the
establishment of diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R. fcr
a practical reason: ncn-recognition had not accomplished any
purpose. Ihe Soviets were clearly in charge of Russia and it
was necessary to deal with them, especially anticipating
problems with Germany and Japan. In November, Soviet Foreign
Minister Maxim Litvincv came to Washington and, after brief
negotiations, diplomatic relations between Ihe United States
of America and Ihe Union of Soviet Socialist Republics were
established on 17 November, 1933. s
Cne cf the primary pre-conditions of recognition laid
down by Eoosevelt was a Soviet pledge of non-intervention in
United States domestic affairs. Ihis was easy for the
Soviets to agree to, because they always held (publicly)
that the Comintern was independent of Soviet government
influence, within two years, the facade of friendly rela-
tions had disappeared. 6 It evaporated because of misunder-
standings (on the American side) regarding the wording cf
the Roosevelt-Li tvincv agreements and because of a growing
reali2ation in the United States of the realities of the
Stalin regime. Ihe Scviet constitution of 193o, ostensibly
guaranteeing the rights of Soviet citizens, went intc effect
four acnths after the first great purge trial. As the scope
of the purges became known in the West, the divergence
between Soviet rhetoric and the reality of Soviet behavior
increasingly poisoned relations between the two countries.
s Ulan, A., Expansion and Coexistence, (New York:
Praeger, 19 73) pT2TT
^
^Russia ,_Ihe_Sqviet Union, _and the_Unrted S.tates
,
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ficosevelt continued to work for cooperation with the
Soviets throughout the thirties, nowever. Whatever his
personal feeling about Soviet communism, he considered
Germany and Japan to re the paramount danger. The bombing
of the U£S Panay in lecember 1937 fueled his desire to foim
an anti-Japanese coalition in the Pacific. The Munich agree-
ment of 1938 surrendering the Sudetenland to Germany had
similar effect on his thinking vis-a-vis the Germans. For
these reasons the Soviet-Nazi Pact of August 1939, their
joint assault on Poland in September 1939, and the Russian
invasion of Finland ic November 1939 were a blow tc his
hopes of joining with the Soviet Union in containing the
greater menaces of Germany and Japan.
Adolf Hitler was to be the agent of improved
Soviet-American relations. Between June and December 1941,
he accomplished the astonishing feat of declaring war on
both the United States and the Soviet Union. The "Grand
Alliance" was forged against the (finally) common German
foe.
This unlikely coalition did little to ease the tension
inherent in the Soviet-American relationship. Even before
the war was won, there was significant bickering among the
Allies. The chief point of argument concerned the opening of
a second front in Eurcpe. Stalin then, and Soviet Leaders
since, maintained that Great Britain and the United States
deliberately delayed opening a second front, ostensibly with
the motive of allowing Germany and the U.S.S.fi to exhaust
themselves, creating an opportunity for Great Britain and
the United States to step in and establish the post-war
international structure. The Soviets perhaps had some reason
for this feeling. Indeed, for every one American killed
fighting the Germans, fifty Russians died. 7
7 Eeitzell, R., The Uneasy Alliance: America, Britain,
and_R uss ia
,
_1$ 4 1 ^1 9537~Tffew "Tork"T~?ra eg e r7~TB"72) " p7~3F9~
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The Soviet charges had some validity, but ignored the
realities of British and American military capabilities at
the time (1942-43). And in fact there was a second front
which heavily engaged British and American resources: The
Pacific Theater. The .Pacific war undoubtedly relieved Soviet
defense concerns on their eastern frontier, albeit this was
little ccnsolaticn with the Germans assaulting Moscow and
leningrad. The Western allies had the option of selecting
when and where to open the second front in Europe and the
policy arrived at ( defeating German forces in Africa first,
moving into Italy, and finally tc Normandy) reflects real-
istic choices made between ends and means.
"Anglo-American strategy relected the rational balancing
of objectives and resources which any wise statesman
will engage in, if he has the cnoice. Stalin, in part as
a result cf his own bungling diplomacy between 1939 and
194 1, was simply unfortunate enough not to have had that
choice ." 8
The Grand Alliance collapsed rapidly following victory.
It had served its function, and without a common enemy the
coalition cf such divergent societies could not be
sustained. Additionaly, the players had changed. Roosevelt
had died and Churchill had been replaced by Clement Attlee;
the alliance could not survive the passing of two of its
three founders. There was also a fundamental change in the
world fchich posed a real threat to Soviet interests.
"The end of the war marked the beginning of a veritable
world-wide revcluticn. the essence of which was the
eventual victory of the American style over older civi-
lizations and ways cf life. It was not only a matter of
refrigerators or automobiles or that disregard of
customs and traditions which resentful Frenchmen dubbed
coca-cclonization, but the whole individualist and secu-
larist thrust of American culture." 9
8 Eussia , The Soviet Union , an d The United States
, p . 1 55
9 Ulam, A-, The Rivals: America and Russia since World
Bar _ II, (New YorTTf_Vi:RIng,~T9~nr-p7~7TT
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Ihis cultural onslaught (probably no one in America realized
it was ongoing) *as and is really more dangerous to the
C.S.S.B. than American military power. The military threat
by each country to the other derives from a fundamental
social conflict. When given the opportunity, people will
choose freedom over tctalit arianism- Ihis is an intolerable
menace tc the Soviets. Their tangible response to this
problem became known as the Iron Curtain.
Stalin guickly ccxsolidated Soviet holdings in Eastern
Europe and along the Ealtic coast- He also carefully elimi-
nated Western influence as much as possible in the area and
pursued Soviet hegemony there. In February, 1947, Stalin
agreed tc peace treaties with Italy, Finland, Hungary, and
Eomania, then promptly proceeded to ignore the democratic
safeguards provisioned therein. The treaties legalized most
of the Scviet Union 1 s territorial holdings to date: Finnish
territory extending the Soviet border to Norway, seventy
thousand sguare liles of Polish soil, the Czechoslovakian
province of Euthenia, and Bukovina and Bessarabia from
Eomania. Combined with Moscow's annexation of Latvia,
lithuania, and Estonia (never recognized ny the United
States), and East Prussia, the U.S.S.B. assumed complete
control of the eastern Baltic Sea and established a common
border with every country in Eastern Europe, facilitating
military and political control. 10
Stalin's policy of expansion had been successful for the
most part. He had failed to secure Iran and Turkey, but he
had net had strong military control there in the first
place. He had succeeded in securing Eastern Europe. The
cooperative aspects of the Grand Alliance had completely
disappeared now. In 1S46, Maxim Litvinov, now practically in
exile in Moscow though still a deputy foreign minister, gave
1 °Eubinstein , A., Soviet Foreign Policy since World War
II:
_liperia l_an d_Glolal~TBo s^nT~¥inOrop7 T¥BT]~~p7~55^T7
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these reasons for the breakdown of East-West relations to a
Western reverter: first,
"there has been a ieturn in Eussia to the outmoded
concept of security in terms of territory -- the more
you've got, the sarer you are";
and second,
"the root cause is the ideological conception prevailing
{in Moscow} that conflict between the Communist and




The American attitude toward the Soviet Union steadily
darkened during the pest World War II years. George Kennan's
"Mr. X" article of 194712 fc a a dramatic effect and the policy
cf containment was forming. 13
1948 was a watershed in Soviet- American relations in
many ways. Two events in particular confirmed in Western
policymakers' minds the expansionist aims of the U.S.S.E.
First was the Czech coup in February, which shattered the
illusion of democratic freedom in that country. Second, and
involving the United States much more intimately, was the
Eerlin blockade in June. Truman's unexpected (from the
Soviet point of view) response, the airlift, forced the
Soviets to back down rather than risk direct confrontation
with the United States. The Cold War was morn.
American responses in the early years of the Cold War
were conditioned to a large extent by its military strategy,
which was in turn guided by six interrelated factors.
ll Qucted in Kaiser, R., Cold Wint er, Cold War, (New
York: Atteneum, 1974) p. 12-13
i2iix» "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," Foreign Affairs,
(July, 1947)
13Kennan had actually discussed the concept of contain-
ment in his famous "long telegram" of 1946.
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first, Ihe Ucdted States enjoyed unquestioned nuclear
supremacy until the 1S60's. Ihe threat of the application of
nuclear firepower, particularly in countervalue strikes, was
deemed sufficient tc protect roth the United States and her
allies- Nuclear superiority also allowed (apparently) for
the reduction of more expensive conventional forces.
Seccnd, American views of the nature of warfare were
heavily drawn from tie experience of World Wars I and II;
namely, attrition warfare. The United States had suffered
the least damage of any of the belligerents in World War II
and saw itself realistically as better able to compete in
this style cf warfare than any other nation. Ihe longer a
war might last, the greater would become the American
advantage.
Third, the United States possessed an absolute advantage
in naval power over any potential enemy. America was unques-
tioned mistress of tie sea. flexible and mobile naval
forces, with their global power projection capability,
granted American policymakers considerable political freedom
cf action.
fourth, and a corollary to the third point above, the
principle potential adversaries, namely the Soviet Union and
the People's Republic of China, were restricted in the use
of military forces tc areas contiguous to their borders.
Cnly the United States had the logistic capability tc
operate effectively anywhere in the world.
Fifth, the United States emerged from World War II
stronger economically and militarily than she had been at
its commencement. This could not be sard about any of the
ether telligeren ts. United States economic advantage was so
strong she could affcrd to initiate programs to rebuild
Europe and Japan.
Sixth, withiB the United States there was general
concensus concerning the ultimate military objectives and
16
the ctjectives of American diplomacy. The Communists were
the threat; they were hostile and expansionist, and they
cnly understood force. 14 Thus military force (and the threat
to use it) hecame an integral cart of containment and
remained so even after the Soviets acquired their own
nuclear capability. Ir the succession of crises which char-
acterized the Krushchev regime, American policy makers were
put en the horns of a dilemma. For in addition to contain-
ment, there was another essential objective in American
foreign policy: to avoid World War III. Both objectives have
equal priority, with the following conflict. By adopting
strong pclicies to limit communist expansion or to rcll it
tack, the prospect of thermonuclear war increases. By
seeking tc avoid conflict and crisis with the U.S.S.B., the
United States might he forced to accept communist infiltra-
tion or consolidation of power in some area. American
statesmen have dealt with this quandary by resorting to the
concept cf the "balance of power", rather than deal with
each situation in absolute terms. World War III would only
be risked if the balance were in danger of being catastro rh-
ically upset. This concept has been used by both sides, 15
for the spectre of thermonuclear holocaust has discouraged
both the United States and the Soviet Union from direct
engagement cf forces. 16 The dangerous crises have occurred
as a result of misperception by one or both sides (the Cuban
Missile Crisis) or proxy warfare run amuck (the 1973
Arab-Israeli war).
i^Ercwn G. , and Kerb, L.. "The Economic and Political
Restraints en Force Planning". Naval War College Review,
(July-August 197S) p. 51-62
15 lhe Soviet concept of the Correlation of Forces
includes the western idea of the balance of power to some
extent.
16Craig, G. and George, A., Force_and Statecraft:
Eiplcmatic Problems cf Our lime, "JFew Tori: UxTor<I7 19 83)
"Chap . 9
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America has survived these crises, possibly primarily
with a large dose of good lucX. Are the processes of
American ccnstit utional democracy, so brilliantly conceived
to prevent dangerous concentrations of power and to protect
the people from their government, sufficient to cope effec-
tively with the Soviet foe? Can the United States afford the
design inefficiencies effecting that domestic protection
when faced with a determined, patient external threat?
18
III. SYSTEMIC FACTORS
"Cur means ox governing ourselves, while it doubtless
derives from European and Asiatic sources, nevertheless is
rot cnly unique and a mystery to non-Americans but a matter
cf wonder tc Americars themselves. That it works at all is





1 - The Ma disonian Model
fihen the Constitutional Convention met in
Philadelphia in the string of 1787, the debate centered on
the central dilemma which had fatally undermined the
Articles cf Confederation: how to strike a workaole balance
between a central government and the sovereign powers cf the
states. The recommended solutions fell into three catego-
ries: 1} form an all-powerful central government; 2) diffuse
power completely among the states; 3) form a viable balance.
Alexander Hamilton espoused the first argument bril-
liantly. Ke presented eloquently wny a strong central
government is necessary,
"A man must be far gone in Utopian speculations who
can seriously doubt that if these States should either be
wholly disunited, or cnly united in partial confederacies,
the subdivisions into which they mignt be thrown would have
frequent and violent contests with each other. To presume a
want cf motives for such contests as an argument against
their existence would be to forget that men are ambitious,
vindictive, and rapacious. To look for a continuation cf
harmony between a number of independent, unconnected sover-
eignties situated in the same neighborhood would be to
disregard the uniform course of human events, and to set at
defiance the accumulated experience of the ages." 18
17 Steinbeck, J., America and the Americans, (New York
Viking, 196 6) p. 35
19
and went further (during the Convention) to recommend a
lifetime President, .Senate, and an absolute veto power of
the central government over the states.
At the other €nd of the spectrum was George Mason.
He d€sir€d the weakest form of central government which
could still support confederacy. He met with little support
for this idea at the Convention, as most of the 55 delegates
.believed the reason they were there in the first place was
recause the Articles cf Confederation had so obviously teen
lacking.
Between these polar positions was James Madison.
Madiscn had considered the problems of confederacies, tcth
by historical examples and the contemporary Articles, very
profoundly tefore arriving at the Convention. In
Philadelphia he presented the so-called "Virginia Plan",
which illustrated that the sovereignty of each state must be
subordinate to the national government. A republic formed
with a basic conflict of power between the national and
state government could not survive either internal or
external dangers. Madison was firmly in agreement with
Hamilton that the federal government must be supreme. But
the prospect of an all-powerful central sovereign terrified
him, and thus he developed the brilliant model of republican
government which was to become the Constitution of the
United States.
Madison had little faith in human nature when
granted political power and so attempted to construct a
system ty which human nature, good or bad, could be used for
the ccmmcn good. He did not try to suppress "factions"
(political parties), as Washington had suggested, tut rather
saw them as natural by-products of liberty.
* 8 Hanilton, A., "federalist No. 6" in Hamilton, A.,
Madiscn, J., and Jay, J., The federalist Pa pers , (New Ycrk
Mentor, 1S61)
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"There are again two methods for removing the causes
of faction: the one
essential to its ex.
citizen the same op:
interests.
It could never he more truly said than of the first
remedy that it is worse than the disease. Liberty is tc
faction what air is tc fire, an ailment without which it
instantly expires. But it could not be a less folly tc
abolish liiertY ( which is essential to political life,because it nourishes faction than it would be to wish the
annihilation of air* which is essential to animal life,
because it imparts tc fire its destructive agency." 19
The key was tc prevent any faction from becoming a
tyrannical majority. By extrapolation he applied this same
idea to the states themselves. How could the existence cf
nearly sovereign political entities, the states, be trans-
formed into a source cf strength for the new republic,
instead of the scurce of enfeetlement and discord they had
been under the Articles of Confederation?
lart of the answer was the formation of three
branches of government, with their different areas of
interest and responsitility . The second part of the solution
was tc make these three branches responsible to separate
constituencies with staggered election times. Thus the
states, principally through the Legislative Branch, were
central to the process of federal government.
"The adversaries to the plan of the convention,
instead cf considering in the first place what degree of
power was absolutely necessary for the purposes or the
federal government, have exhausted themselves in a secondary
inguiry into the possible ccnseguences of the proposed
degree of power to the governments of tne particular States.
But if the Union, as has been shown, be essential to the
security of the people of America against foreign danger: if
it be essential to their security against contentions and
wars among the different States; if it be essential tc guard
them against those viclent and oppressive factions which
embitter the blessings of liberty and against those military
establishments which must gradually poison its very foun-
tain: if, in a word, the Union be essential to the happiness
of the people of America, is it not preposterous to urge as
an objection to a government, without wnich the objects of
the Unior cannot be attained, that sucn a government may
i*Madiscn, J., "federalist No. 10"
21
derogate from the importance of the governments of the indi-
vidual States?"20
In fact/ te thought the states would dominate the federal
government
,
"Ihe powers delegated by the proposed Constitution
to the federal government are few and defined. Those which
are tc remain in the State governments are numerous and
indefinite. The former will be exercised principally on
external objects, as war. peace, negotiation, and foreign
commerce; with which last the cower of taxation will, for
the most part, he connected. The powers reserved to the
several States will extend to all objects which, in the
ordinary course cf affairs, concern the lives, liberties,
and properties of the people, and the internal order,
improvement, and prosperity of the State." 21
Ibis may have been a sales promotion for the new
Constitution. The eighty-five Federalist Papers were, after
all, written to sell the new government to the people. Eut
many or" the profound thoughts which went into the framework
of the Ccnstitution itself are presented eloquently in the
Federalist Papers. The dilemma of creating a federal govern-
ment strong enough tc carry out its r esponsloilities without
being tyrannical is central to the Constitutional debate,
and Madison clearly believed he had found a solution.
"The accuaulation of all powers, legislative, executive,
and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few,
or manv, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or
elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition
of tyranny, were the federal Constitution, therefore,
really chargeable with this accumulation of power, or
with a mixture of powers, having a dangerous tendency tc
such an accumulation no further argument would be neces-
sary tc inspire a universal reprobation of the
system." 22
20Madison, J., "Federalist No. 45"
2 *Ibid.
22Madiscn, J., "federalist No. 47"
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Clearly, Madison did not believe his system had "a dangerous
tendency to such an accumulation" of power. The idea that
collisicns cf conflicting interests could be healthy for the
new government was scmething of a shock to some of Madison's
idealistic contemporaries. But there it was.
Ihis model was designed to prevent dangerous concen-
trations of power and it has dene this well, by and large,
throughout the history of this nation. It does not promote
efficiency in planning and policymaking. Diffusion cf power
still exists structurally, but in times of danger great
powers are granted to and assumed by tne Executive to deal
with the crisis. What Madison could not foresee was a time
when the perception cf danger and crisis would become almost
continuous, and the relationship of the Executive to the
legislature would be nearly transformed.
2 • Growing .Exe cutiv e P ower
1h€ pressures of World War II and the ensuing Cold
War upset the Madisonian balance dramatically. The mcdel of
separate constituencies seemed to hinder the effective
pursuit cf coherent foreign policy, particularly in light of
increasing speed of events in the modern world. In this
context, Congress seemed to be the paradigm of weaknesses
inherent in democratic society, yet it still had vital
(Constitutionally mandated) roles to play in the national
security planning and policymaking process.
"Notwithstanding whatever larger and more long-term
vision individual members might develop concerning
international affairs and American participation in
them, as a practical matter the next election (usually
two and no more than six years away) is the most impor-
tant fact of life for the legislator. Nonetheless, under
the constitutional design substantial foreign policy
power was given to the Congress, presumably with the
expectation that the institution would exercise that
power with responsibility to a larger vision of interest
than the individual member's political survival.
Unfortunately, the critics asserted, the reality was too
frequently contrary to the constitutional theory, and
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nowhere was de Tocgueville's criti^ae of democracy more
appropriate than with respect to Congress." 23
As the UDited States undertook the task of global
management in the 1950*5 and 1960's, the office of the
Presidency assumed greater and greater freedom of action.
Particularly since 1956, with the onset of a seemingly
endless string of international crises, Presidential power
grew as the Congress became more and more reactive. Crises
demand swift action, and the President, not Congress, has
the means for ^uick action at his disposal. In competing
with the President, the Congress already had two strikes
against it.
"The legislative branch can hardly be a force fcr
foreign affairs leadership and coherence. Congress can at
most re a restraint en the President - sometimes for good,
sometimes fcr ill - cr the source of useful but sporadic
initiatives. To the extent that Congress can impose specific
restrictions like the Cooper-Church amendment prohibiting a
return of our troops to Cambodia f or affect actual fcreigrpolicy ty general lecislation, it can have an undeniable
effect. But this influence is limited primarily to
constraining, modifying, or supplementing Presidential and




3 - yietnam_ and^ the
_
Har_Power s_Re sol ut ion
Unilateral freedom of Presidential action and recip-
rocal Congressional submission peaked with the conduct of
the Vietnam War. Presidential authority had become so
swollen that President Johnson apparently did not seriously
23 Cliver, J. and fcathan , J., "The American Environment
for Security Planning," Kronenberg, P. f ed., Planning U.S.Security; Defens e P laining in the Eighti es, (TIew TorKT"
Tergamon, T9B7J" p. TE. The de Tocgueville reference
concerns his famous Eemocracy in Amer ica, vol. 1 , (New York:
Vintage Eooks
<
1945)."In particular, ""Foreign politics
demand scarcely any cf those qualities which are peculiar to
a democracy.
"
24Destler, I.M. , Presidents, Bureaucrats, an d Foreign
I°ii£I* (Princeton: IrinceTon~press7-7S?727~p.~B5=F5
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consider requesting a declaration of war in 1964 after the
famous Gulf of Tonkin incident. The Southeast Asia
Eesoluticn cf 1964 (tetter known as the Gulf of Tonkin
Eesoluticn) could be consider as the quintessential example
cf Congressional acguiescence. 25 As Senator Jacob Javits was
to later comment, the Congressional power of decisior had
been surrendered. The Congress had abdicated its constitu-
tional duties. 26
Eut the pendulum had begun to swing back. The
commitment cf millions of American soldiers to Vietnam
strictly en Presidential authority and with no clear stra-
tegic goals, combined with increasingly frequent claims or
Presidential prerogative, particularly under President
Nixon, finally awoke the Congress to their responsibilities.
Ihe War towers Eesolution of November 1973 was passed (over
President Nixon's veto). Its purpose:
"
...„Tc fulfill the intent of the framers of the
Constitution of the United States and insure that the
collective judgment cf both the Congress and the
President will apply to the introduction of United
States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations
where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly
indicated by the circumstances, and to the continued use
of such forces in hostilities or in such situations." 27
Requiring Congressional assent in order to commit
American military forces anywhere for more than ninety days,
the War lowers Eesolution can be seen as something cf a
Congressional renaissance. It implicitly requires the
Congress to assume responsibility, with the President, for
the deployment of American armed forces. The support of the
25 Ihe Eesolution jrassed in the Senate by 88-2 and in the
House by unanimous voice vote 416-0.
26Javits, J., Who Ma kes War: Ihe Pre si dent Ver sus
Congress, (New York": "Sorrow ,~T9737
27 94th Congress, Committee on International Relations,
United States House cf Representatives, "The War Powers
Eesoluticn," (Washington, D.C., 1975)
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American people, through their elected representatives, will
be reguired for commitment of American soldiers. In this
way, hopefully, the schism retween the American people and
their Amy experienced during the Vietnam war may te avoided
in the future. 28
E. Ill EEFENSE EUDGI3
Ihe defense budget is a majcr constraint on the effec-
tive inplement ation cf American military policies. 29 In
theory strategic planners set force structure priorities,
with the budget then structured to facilitate successful
execution of national defense policy. In reality force
planning and budgeting considerations are undertaken in a
vacuum fcr the following reasons:
1. Ite United States does not nave the resources to
fully implement its standing military policies. Its
present "one and a half wars" policy would reguire at
least 750 ships, 30 Army and Marine Corps divisions,
and 35 Tactical Air flings. As of fiscal year 1983,
tie United States possessed 443 ships, 16 Army and 3
Marine Corps divisions, and 26 Tactical Air wings 30
barely enough to fight one conventional war in
Europe, let alone another "half" contingency
elsewhere.
28 Suamers, H.G. , in his book On S tra tegy, (New Ycrk:
Eell, 1982) , addresses this point at length. The Army was
the enemy re a large portion cf the American public. When
that cccurs, this nation is in very serious trouble.
29 £rcbahly the mest comprehensive treatment of the
rudget is contained in Wildavsky, A., The Politic s of the
Eudgetary Process, (Ecston: Little, Brown Z~Co~, 1'91'SJ
3 °Weinrerger , C.fl., Secretary of Defense, Annual Report
to the Ccng res s, .Fiscal_Year 1983, (flash in gton7~IJ7€77~IJTST~
Government "Printing Cffice, "T9"83J" , appendix A-i
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2. Political leaders rarely provide sufficient guidance
to military planners. Politicians seldom know new
they will react in a given situation and similarly
have little advance idea of what the country should
dc in a crisis. Additionally, they like to keep as
many options cpen as long as possible and have diffi-
culty giving pclicy guidance in the abstract. Thus
fcrce planning is undertaken with little regard to
likely actual use of forces, or most planning is dene
en a "worst case" basis, resulting in force plans
with little or no relationship to resource
constraints.
3. The budget process is so lengthy (about twenty months
from beginning to end) that any policy guidance given
at the beginning of the tudget cycle is likely to be
irrelevant by the time the finished budget is
produced.
4. The defense budget, because of its enormous size, has
serious effects on the national economy. The FY 1983
budget totalled 3257,983,000,000.31 About 807c of all
federal employees work for the Department of Defense.
Increases in defense spending are considered infla-
tionary because they put more money into the hands of
workers without increasing the supply of available
goods for them to buy. At the same time, cuts in
defense spendiig in any given area can have disas-
trous effects en local communities. Reductions in
military aircraft procurement, for example, are
likely to dramatic effect on the economies of Seattle
or the south San Francisco 3ay-
3l lbid., appendix B-
1
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5. Unlike most of the remainder of the federal budget,
the defense budget is not mandated by law. If a
person qualifies for Medicare or Social Security, the
gcvernment must pay. It is mandated by law and thus
their budgets are basically uncontrollable. Most of
the defense budget is controllable; it is thus cften
tinkered with ty both Presidents and Congress for
political ends. It should be noted however that the
military goals the budget ostensibly is designed to
fulfill seldom are modified in relation to the
altered budget.
6- The Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System
(PPBS) and attendant systems analysis, wnile helpful
in developing a baseline budget, is not adeguate for
fcrce planning and for developing a realistic budget
tc support it because many of the variables in poli-
cymaking and fcrce planning are not quantifiable.
Many crucial decisions must be made by intuition and
judgment, which are not well coordinated with PPES.
And there is always the danger of the system
acguiring a life of its own:
"Kithin recent years, the PPBS has grown top-heavy and
congested with paperwork and detail, leading to an overem-
phasis en programming and unneeded data, to the neglect of
strategic planning and professional military advice. 1 ' 32
PPES reguires an ability tc know what is needed wnich is
beyond present human capabilities. By assuming that objec-
tives can be stated precisely and quantifiable measures can
be found for them, PIES is doomed to failure from the
onset. 33 PPES also makes it impossible to avoid expensive
failures.
3 2ibid. p. 1-46
33lh§_Pclitics of the Budgetary Process, p. 199
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"If error is to t€ altered, it must be relatively easy
to correct. But EP3 makes it hard. Its 'systems* are charac-
terized by their projicnents as highly differentiated and
tightly linked. Ine rationale for program budgeting lies in
its connectedness -- like programs are grouped together.
Program structures are meant to replace the confused concat-
enations of line-items with clearly differentiated, non-
overlapping boundaries; only ore set of programs to a
structure. This means that a change in one element or
structure must result in a cnange reverberating throughout
every element in the same system. Instead of alerting cnly
neigntcrirg units or central control units, wnich would make
change feasible,, all are, so to speak, wired together, so
the choice is erfectively all or none." 34
7. lie defense budget is too large and complex for any
one authority to fully grasp. With over 1700 program
elements, over 5,000 line items, and approximately
127 different accounting systems, the budget tends to
become merely the compilation of all the program
managers' individual inputs, not the executive tool
of prudent strategic planning. 35 Each service
attempts to structure itself to be independent of tie
ctier services in time of emergency. Each service
desires to rely only on its own resources.
Theoretically, the Secretary of Defense is above it
all, tying tocether service requests into a coherent
force structure, but he has neither the time nor the
staff to cope with such a task. The Joint Chiefs of
Staff (JCS) is even more limited, its staff being
constrained to four hundred personnel, and even less
able to evaluate effectively individual service
inputs. Service staffs average about two thousand
personnel, and as the Joint Chiefs are also the heads
of their respective services, it is very difficult
for them appraise their home services' proposals in
the joint arena in a unbiased manner. Even before the
3*Ibid.
, p. 201
3S Interview with Cr. Richard Perle, Assistant Secretary
of Defense (Internaticnal Security Policy) , 8 May 1984.
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tudget goes tc Congress there is little consistency,
except in the continuation of previous years'
£ iogiams.
Cnce in Congress, any semblance of strategic planning
coherence which may have survived in tne budget as it exited
the Pentagon is lost. The Department of Defense structures
the tudcet in program categories, such as Research and
Development, Strategic Forces, etc. Congress authorizes
funds by line item, such "Procurement, Army." Thus an intel-
ligently structured program designed to support a carefully
reasoned policy can be ruined by line item appropriation in
Congress. And the Congressmen are may not even aware they
have done any harm.
8. The defense budget is very susceptible to shiftirg
pclitical winds- Unnecessary bases are kept in opera-
tion because their closure would have detrimental
effect on an influential congressman's district.
Unnecessary new weapons systems are introduced and
otsclete old cnes kept in production because cf
powerful business and political contacts on Capitol
Hill.
Political pressures also constrain DoD from implementing
necessarj policies domestically. For example, political
pressures in Wisconsin, Michigan, and Texas precluded
construction of Project Seafarer in any of those states. The
country's most reliable and survivable strategic system, the
SSBN force, thus went wanting for a more reliable communica-
tion system to more fully realize its potential. Seafarer
was eventually built, but much reduced in size and transmit-
ting power.
9. The tudget process is slow and the development and
fiocurement of systems even slower. Thus policy
makers are typically confronted with an existing
force designed 15-20 years ago or more, and knowing
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that any impact they may have on the system will net
he felt mere another 15-20 years. At any given time,
the force in being determines the policies pursued,
and force planting done in this context may have
little meaning by the time those planned forces are
translated intc hardware. 36
C. 1BI HEDIA — THE EOOBTH BEANCH OF GOVERNMENT?
The activity of the press, and the manipulation of it by
governmental actors, is one of the most potent forces on the
American political scene. Its effect upon the Presidency,
the Executive bureaucracy, and the Congress has been real-
ized enly in the past few decades. With the development of
instantaneous mass cemmunic ation, the modern press corps has
assumed powers unimagined by previous generations. The revo-
lution in the power cf publicity in America can create
events 37 and even create changes in the fundamental balance
cf the government itself.
1 - The President
_
and the. Tress
The President of the United States is the most
highly publicized individual on earth. He has instant access
to the media as he sees fit. His most trivial actions or
unguarded remarks are instant news the world over. The
President cannot escape the press, but its power can be
detriiiental or beneficial to him depending on how well he
can understand the surtle nuances of American mass media.
36 Brcwn, G. and Kerb, L.. "The Economic and Political
Eestraints en Force Planning", Naval War College Review,
July-August 1979 ^
37The 1S68 Democratic Convention is clearly a case in
point. Demonstrators, many blocks from the convention
itself- chanted "The fchole World Is Watching" as they
clashed with Chicago police.
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Central to his control of the press is the
Presidential press conference. Ihe conference contains
opportunities for both triumph and disaster- The President
selects the basic content of each conference by his opening
remarks, although the press often chooses the form the
conference will take once questioning begins. The conference
is, as Douglas Cater described it, "a central act in the
high drama of American government." 38 Indeed, the signifi-
cance of the press conference is difficult to overestimate.
It is one of the few moments when the President stands
before the American public without the many trappings of
office which normally separate him from it. It is an oppor-
tunity for him to create events, focus national and interna-
tional attention on problems he chooses, and attach the
degree of gravity he desires to those problems.
Ihe press conference otviously entails risks. After
the brief opening statement, any subject is fair game.
Questions nay range ficm great affairs of foreign policy to
a small scandal brewing at the bottom of an executive
agency. To the former the President gives much reflection;
he has probably not heard about the latter before then. Yet
he must handle both fcith aplomb. He risks embarrassment, and
guite possibly the guestions he was best prepared to answer
will not be asked at all. In this sense the press holds a
strong hand in the conference, for reporters tend to ask
guestions which reflect the interests of the newspapers,
television news networks, or wire-services they represent. A
press conference may consist of guestion on Iowa perk prices
and the like, while never approaching a foreign policy or
defense issue.
38Cater, D.< The fourth Branch of Government, (New York
Vintage Eoo ks, 1 S557~725
There is a real danger in the Presidential press
conference which is engendered by the open and rather casual
atmosphere which tends to prevail there. That is the possi-
bility of a stray, unguarded remark being made by the
President, subsequently taken cut of context and blown cut
cf prcjcrticn. As the world grows ever more dangerous, the
consegueDces of these slips-of-the-tongue become ever mere
grave, lie classic example of this political phenomenon is
President Truman's press conference in November 1951. The
Chinese had shortly before entered the Korean War and it was
becoming clear that anctner retreat down the peninsula was
imminent. When asked about the possible use of nuclear
weapecs in the Korean theater, the President reponded that
such weapons were "always under consideration." "Always" was
emitted from the headlines the following day and the stcry
that President Truman was seriously considering the use of
nuclear weapons in Kcrea flashed across the world.
That incident illustrates the harm which can be dene
by a slightly careless Presidential remark and a more than
slightly irresponsible press. Nevertheless, the press
conference is a great tool for a skillful president. It
affords hia an opportunity to keep attention focused on
himself. By his words and gestures he can give powerful
emphasis to his programs or denigrate those of his political
rivals. And unlike a formal speech, he has an chance there
to chat with the public, rather than lecture to it. 39
2 - Congress and the Press
The era of Senator Joseph McCarthy (roughly
1950-1953), climaxing with the Army-McCarthy hearings, made
the Congress, not the President, the center of public atten-
tion and the principle source of information and news in the
3*Ibid., p. 26
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ration's caj:itol. Although Presidents were soon to
recapture the limelight, a change in how American government
functions had taken place.
"It is important, I believe, to examine the conse-
quences of this shift in public attention. The investiga-
tions themselves were singularly barren of conclusions,
respite all the furor, they did not result in drastic legis-
lative reforms or even in substantial defeats to the
Administration's foreign program. Yet, it would be idle tc
claim that this shift had not affected the balance of power
in American government. It served to diminish the useful-
ness of a great many cf the President's chief lieutenants
and tc elevate into positions of commanding importance hith-
erto ctscure members cf Congress. It enabled one compara-
tively junior Senator lacking the conventional trappings of
seniority and prestige to sustain for a considerable time a
threat tc the President's control over the Executive Eranch.
It created serious doubts at home and arroad whether the the
President did in fact stand at the helm of government during
a critical time in world af fairs. "*°
The new found publicity power of the Congress has
not gene unnoticed by subsequent generations of Congressmen.
Congressmen are infatuated with public opinion and know that
the hometown press is one of the most powerful influences in
their cortinued political futures. The modern press and the
modern Congress were lade for each other. Reporters
frequently outnumber legislators on the House floor and in
committee. With the arrival of television in the House of
Representatives, Congressmen can now make carefully choreo-
graphed performances to be broadcast back to their
constituents.
It was perhaps inevitable that Congress would become
nearly cc-egual with the White House as a news beat. The
President is the center of public fascination because of the
immense power personified in that one personage. The House
of Representatives and the Senate lack such power, but
Congressional proceedings are open by and large, with corre-




exert careful control over how news is released from the
Rhite House and reporters are dependent on his favors in
that «ay. Eut Congress is open territory.
Eut more than easy access is involved. The business
cf Congress is tailor-made for sensational news reporting.
Congress is the scene of high intrigue and drama. The
constitutional tensions and balances stand out in bold
relief during Congressional hearings and floor
deliberations.
Easy access and a continuous flow of good stories
can lead to a congressional bias in the news. It also makes
for strarge bedfellows. Newsmen and Congressmen tend to
develop intimate and privileged reiationsnips. Congressmen
are dependent on newsmen for good publicity back in the
local districts. Newsaen are dependent on Congressmen for
"exclusives" and "scoops." News is often leaked to the press
as a personal favor ard newsmen recognize this. Neither
profits by jeopardizing this relationship and in
Executive-Legislative sguabtles, tne press tends to come
down cr the Congressional side. Abuses in the Executive,
when aired in the press, always have a Congressional
committee standing by to inguire into them, with much
further publicity. Ihe Executive has no corresponding organ
for attackirg Congressional abuses.
This intimate relationship leads to selective
publicity, which is harmful to good government in this
context. Ihe Congress becomes something of a protected
species. Each year, during the budgetary debates and sguah-
bles with the President, Congressmen cut funds from military
programs with great fanfare. The action is dutifully
rewarded with news retorts cf Congressional concern over
unbalanced budgets, Executive insensitivity to welfare
programs, etc., while later in the year Congress will guietly
restore the funds through supplemental appropriations,
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seldcir given play in the open press. Newsmen don' t dare tell
tne truth (that Congressmen make the cuts with every inten-
tion ci restoring the funds later) for fear of alienating
their precicus Congressional contacts. The sorer business of
goverrmer.t is increasingly perverted by excessive media
exposure.
Perhaps American government has reached a point of
cver-ccmmunicaticn and over-publicity. As Daniel Eoorstin
point out, no society can survive unrestrained communica-
tion. Democracy thrives on selective communication selected
ry the self-contiolled citizen.
"Eut democracy depends on the communication which is
sharing, not on that whicn is purely self-expressive, explo-
sive cr vituperative. Our new opportunities and our new
temptations to o verccmmunicate reguire a new and harder
selx-discipline among citizens, one of the most difficult
forms of discipline tc enforce. It illustrates the wisdcm of
the English judge who said, 'Civilization must be measured
by the extent of obedience to the unenforceable.' in a world
cr overccmmunication, the survival of a decent society may
willingness to accept tuis truth."* 1depend en our
3 - Ihe Bureaucracy and the Press
The Executive bureaucracy uses the press to influ-
ence Presidential decisions by systematically leaking infor-
mation tc it. The use of leaks is a standard bureaucratic
maneuver in the struggle between career civil servants and
the President's men.
Most often news is released to the press through
formal press conferences and concerns governmental decisiens
already made. A large portion, however, is leaked to the
press for the following reasons:
41 Eocrstin, D.J,, Democracy and Its Discontents:
Beflecticns on Ever ydayXmerica, "[Few Yorl: Hanclom House,
ITTZjy-pTTO-TI —
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1. Tc get a message through to senior officials.
Subordinate officials in the executive departments
can be frustrated by perceived lack, of access to the
Secretary and lack of acceptance of their ideas as to
hew things should be done. Given that everyone on
Washington reads "The Washington Post," judicious
leaking of alternate policies can assure the atten-
tion of the Secretary to them, and gain access tc him
by the disgruntled official.
2. 1c make information appear to originate from a higher
ci mere authoritative source.
3. Because the release of the information is unauthor-
ized. Officials occasionally feel information needs
tc be made public against the wishes of their
superiors and will leak it when formal release vis
press conferences is prohibited. They will at the
same time take elaborate safety precautions to disas-
sociate themselves with the leak.
4. 1c underline rivals. Use of leaks to reduce an oppo-
nent's influence or remove him completely from
government is a common technique. There are several
methods.
a) Try to show an opponent as advocating a position
which lacks any support. During the Cuban Missile
Crisis Adlai Stevenson, United States Ambassador
to the United Nations, attempted to raise some of
the broader implications of the crisis during tie
Cabinet meetings. After pointing out alternative
strategies to those of confrontation and tests of
will, such as trading Jupiter missiles in Turkey
for Soviet missiles in Cuba, he was attacked as
advocating appeasement. After the Crisis had
passed images of Munich were drawn hy columnist
Stewart Alscp in the Saturday Evening Post.
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President Kennedy enjoyed a close association with
Alsop and speculation continues as to whether
Kennedy hiiself leaked the closed Cabinet deliber-
ations.
b) Portray the opponent as incompetent or performing
poorly. Continuing leaks from lower echelon
Environmental Protection Agency officials undout-
tedly had a role in Ann Burford's resignation as
head of the agency.
c) Portray an official as not loyal to the President.
Again, the Stevenson case during and after the
Cuban Missile Crisis is cogent.
d) 1c attract the attention of the President. The
interest of the President in a subject can often
te determined by the intensity of press interest
in it. Issues which would otnerwise remain
entombed in the Executive bureaucracy thus are
dealt with directly by the President.
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IV. HOJ3AN_FACrORS
A. COSZNSOS IN AMEBICAH I HTEBNAIIONAL OUTLOOK
Following World War II there existed a consensus in the
United States on America's prober role in international
affairs, lasically supporting an activist United States rcle
in the world centered en cortaining communism.
In the 1970's, in the aftermath of Vietnam, this glcb-
alist foreign policy consensus dissolved and domestic debate
en the appropriate American ^lace in international politics
drew three tattle lines: the Cold War Internationalists, the
fost-Ccld War Internationalists, and the Isolationists.
1- Ihe Cold War Iiterna ticnalists continue to see the
international system, appropriately, as still functioning
under Cold War precepts. The fundamental orientation of
world affairs in East-West. The United States is confronted
with a dangerous coalition of hostile forces centered in
Moscow. The U.S.S.E. is expansionist and extremely patient,
and will not desist in its efforts to achieve world
hegemony- The Cold War Internationalists see many parallels
in U.S. policies of the 1970's (accommodation and detente)
with the policies pursued by western democracies during the
1930's.
Restoration of a military balance is essential for
United States, because it is the only country in the world
with the potential to resist heavily armed, expansionist
communist power; only the United States has the potential
power to preserve the political and territorial integrity of
the Iree World. * 2
A2 Hclsti, O.E., "Ihe Three-Headed Eagle," International
Studies £uarteriy, (September, 1979), p. 345
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2. I he Post-Cold Ear Internationalists' outlook is rased
en three related concepts.
First, the world is more complex than the vision of the
Cold fcar Internationalists allows. 43 There has been a
systemic change; the roundaries of natron-states no longer
accurately define the international system presently in
existence. Zero~sum game models no longer apply. Although
military security issues are still very important, future
rases cf corflict are more likely found in issues such as
over-population, regional antagonisms in the Third World,
and uncontrolled technological advance. Transnational busi-
nesses are as influential in world events as national
governments, and often more powerful. In short, the areas cf
potential conflict in the world are aligned along a
North-South axis rather than East-West, and traditional
lalance-cf-power Cold War politics is ill-eguipped to deal
fcith then. Ihe United States, despite its enormous power,
cannot sclve the world's problems alone in a system of
complex interdependence.
Second, the U.S.S.E. is not as dangerous to the United
States and the world at large as the Cold War
Internationalists would have us believe. Although mili-
tarily very powerful, the Soviet Union has severe domestic
problems similar to Ihird World nations, and has beccme much
more conservative in its international conduct as it grows
elder
.
Third, though the Soviets may be becoming more conserva-
tive, their motives in international affairs are by no means
philanthropic. The Urited States must play a vital role in
establishing and maintaining a stable world order; shirking
this duty would leave the system open to nations whose
A3Kechane, R. and Kye< J., Power and Interdependence,(Bostcn: little. Brown, & Co. ,~1151'5J Is an o ut"st a na'Tn'g" pres-
entation of the Post-Cold War Internationalist viewpoint.
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designs are domination and hegemony. In tne Post-Cold War
Internationalist vision, the old tactics or confrontaticn
and power politics must be replaced with cooperation, nego-
tiation, and a deeper understanding of the systemic change
in th€ international structure.
3. The Isolationists agree with the Post-Cold War
Internationalists that bi-pclar descriptions of the interna-
tional structure are inaccurate and that the Soviet Union
has been transformed from an aggressively expansionistic
naticr tc a conservative great power with severe domestic
problems. The Isclat icnists attribute the massive Soviet
military build-up to legitimate Soviet domestic security
fears of a two front war and tc traditional Russian
parancia. Although tie Soviet Union possesses tremendcus
military potential, it has little intention of using it
against the West. As there is no other nation capable of
seriously threatening the United States, logically American
problems and threats to American institutions are internal
to the United States itself. Inflation, unemployment,
poverty, etc. are much greater menaces to American security
than any foreign threats.
lie Isolationists obviously part company sharply with
both camps cf the Internationalists, regarding 2ast-west and
North-South axes of conflict as largely irrelevant and
denying that the United States has any valid reason for
extensive international involvement. The United States
should further: 1) negotiate outstanding disputes with the
D.S.S.B-; 2) conduct relations with tne Third World on the
basis of mutual shared interests* 4 and 3) exert influence in
the wcild through exanple, by solving its own pressing
domestic problems. 45
44 lhe Isolationists consider it a cardinal lesson of the
Vietnam War that the Cnited States cannot provide security
for people who are unwilling to work for it.
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E. PRESIDENTIAL IHTEEESIS
The President is the central figure in tne direction and
executior of American foreign policy. In Utopia ne would be
above political interests and operate only for the good of
the nation; in reality the President must incorporate a
broad spectrum of political concerns into his thinking en
issues of international relations, and he must play a
variety of roles when representing those issues to the
American public.
The President, by virtue of the fact that he is the
single mest visible and powerful political figure in the
United States government, simplifies perceptions of the
government and its processes. He provides the principle
source of energy and initiative within the government. He
also serves as a focal point for citizens to gain a sense of
what is gcing on in the government. For many citizens, he is
the only means of following politics.
The President has many ceremonial duties, not unlike the
European monarchies. Combined with the microscopic publicity
surrounding his personal life, these provide an outlet for
emoticnal expression ty the public. Tne sudden death of a
President, for example, is an occasion for national grieving
regardless cf the individual personality of the man himself.
The public reactions following the deaths of Lincoln,
Harding, fiocsevelt, and Kennedy are nearly identical in
their cutpouring of pent-up emotion. The death of a
President also tends to be a unifying experience for the
cation, with partisan politics laid aside, at least
temporarily.
* s Kennan, G., The Cl oud of Danger , (Boston: Little,
Erown, & Co., 19 77J"
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lie President provides the citizenry with a vicarious
means ex" political action, particularly in times of crisis.
People often identify with the President when he is taking
decisive action on some issue, in much the same way they
might identify with a movie hero. A decisive and effective
President tends to give people a sense that they are somehow
more in control of their lives and environment.* 6
Presidential political interests break down to two basic
areas.
1 • Electi on/Domestic Politics
Ihe Presidential election process is one of the mest
profound influences upon Presidential conduct in foreign
affairs. While the system has teen adequate fcr American
international interests for most of the nation's history,
doubts are now arising as to the continues benefits to re
gained ficm it. Ihe guadrennial election defines the
national political life cycle.
"The pattern cf what might be termed Presidential
bur eaurhytms is depressingly familiar. U.S. administrations
confidently sail into office on a tide of extravagant
campaign premises to rectify the failures of the preceding
regime. Eut no matter how desirable these promises, the
initial momentum socn falters in the face of criticism at
home and abroad, the rediscovery of useful policies of the
past, and the difficulty in achieving dramatic results. In
additicn, Congress, frustrated by its own inability to
control events, moves with indecent speed from honeymoon to
divorce. Ihe first grace year is invariably followed by 2
years of retreat. After colliding with complexity and ambi-
guity. Presidents are often forced into about-faces by whatjournalist Halter Lippmann called the suction of the center.
Ey the end cf the third year modest results are often
achieved and the ship of state is fixed on a more or less
steady ccurse. At that point, however, the approaching
Presidential electicn triggers a new foreign policy debate
loaded with hyperbole and distortion, effectively undoing
much hard-wen progress." 47
46 Greenstein, F.I., "The Best-Known American," in
Eurnham. W.D., ed. , Pcli tics/America, (New York: Nostrand,
1973)
47Elccmfield, L.P., "What's Wrong with Transitions,"
foreign f clicy , (Summer, 19 84)
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The impact of the election on foreign policy and
vice-versa forces Presidents to play to three types cf
issues duriig an election year:
1 . Crea tin j__a_g ovular Ima g e among the Ele ctorate.
Presidential popularity usually rises when the
President is seen as acting decisively and achieving
results- Presidents realize that they have greater latitude
cf action in foreign rather than domestic affairs, 48 so
foreign policy initiatives intended for domestic effect are
to be expected prior to the election. The consequences cf
such action cannct reasonably he foreseen, precisely because
they are foreign policies undertaken for domestic effect.
Pramatic foreign policy moves are particularly
desirable if they poitray the President as a man of peace.
President Nixon's overwhelming victory over George McGcvern
in 1972 was undoubtedly aided by his opening of relations
with China and the SAIT I agreement. 49 President Carter's
inability to successfully resolve the Iranian Hostage Crisis
contributed to a critical lack of confidence at the rallot
fox.
. Here is a problem with public opinion as a guide in
foreign pclicy of which the United States experience in
Vietnam is illustrative. The public is not capable of giving
operational policy direction. Ihe public may approve or
disapprove cf actions taken but prediction of the purlic
mood at any givei time is highly speculative. Furthermore,
it usually takes a lcng time before a sizable public
interest in a foreign policy issue is aroused, even with the
presence of a dogged press corps. Public interest in Vietnam
was lew for the first 4-5 years, in spite of rising American
48 wildavsky, A., "The Two Presidencies," in Burnham,
K.D., Polit ics / America, (New York: Nostrand, 1973)
„
.
49 Halperin, M. H. , Bureaucratic Politics and For eig nfolicj (Washington, E.CTT Trook"ings7~iy /ay, p.~FB~
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military involvement and resultant casualties. Even when
public icterest vas driven to a high level, the puhlic still
tended tc support Presidential action regarding Vietnam. 50
The rapid shift in public opinion on Vietnam is a lessen for




cr_Issue to Opponent s.
A vital concern of the President is to avoid issues
which provide political rivals weapons to use against him
during the election. This concern often results in paradox-
ical decisions. The early conduct of the wars in Korea and
Vietnam are illuminative in this regard.
President Truman, after being heavily criticized for
"allowing" China to "go Communist," was politically unarle
to allcw Korea to be cverrun by communists, even after
explicitly stating on several occasions that the United
States had no vital interest there. 51 As American casualties
in Korea grew in number , criticism mounted and American
involvement in Korea became a pivotal campaign issue in the
election of 1952. The dilemma appears in attempting to save
a country from communism while net committing American
soldiers tc accomplish that goal. This problem is also
apparent in Presidents Kennedy's and Johnson* s attempts tc
keep America's commitment to democracy in South Vietnam
highly visitle while giving American combat casualties
suffered in pursuit of that end a low profile. In 1963,
President Kennedy had decided to withdraw all American mili-
tary personnel from Vietnam, but considered it political
suicide to be seen abandoning a fellow democracy just cne
year tefcre the election. He needed to wait until the 1964
election had been sucessfully hurdled.
50 "The Two Presidencies"
5 *Nathan, J. A., and Oliver, J.K., United States Foreign
Policy and florid Or der, (Boston: little , "Brown, Z Co., TJ"87)
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"In 1965 I'll he damned everywhere as a Communist
appeaser. But I don't care. If I tried to pull out
completely now, we would have another Joe McCarthy red
scare en our hands, hut I can do it after I'm reelected.
So we had better make damned sure that I am
reelected-"52
If President Kennedy had not made a critical foreign policy
decision (tc maintain American soldiers in Vietnam until
1965) rased 'heavily cr a domestic political interest,
clearly the history cf American involvement in South East
Asia wculd he very different.
3 - Appealing to Special Interest Groups.
Ihe effect of special interest groups on domestic
policies is easy to measure .because there is an organized
interest group lobbying for nearly every possible area of
concern. Ihese groups provide cues to the President in
advance when a proposed policy is likely to affect them. In
this way they are distinguished from the general public,
which usually renders its judgment after the fact.
In foreign pclicy the effect of special interests is
most pronounced when the domestic economy is perceived to be
affected and wher strong ethnic ties are involved. In the
former, such as the American automobile industry interest in
trade relations with Japan and West Germany, a steady level
of moderate pressure hy industry lobbyists is the rule.
Ihis type of pressure is a more or less constant feature of
the American political scene, because a broad range of
domestic interests are involved, not just election issues.
The health cf the automobile industry has been a barometer
for the health of the American economy in general. In the
latter, special interests are likely to most effective when
narrowly and intensely focused during a time of crisis.
Pressure frcm American Jews was instrumental in United
States recognition of the state of Israel and in overt nili-
5 bureaucratic P clitics and Foreign Policy, p. 70
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tary and economic aid, but has not prevented Americar mili-
tary and economic aid the Israel's Arab neignbors.
2 . Per eign _ Af fa irs^ In t ernational Politics
As stated earlier, Presidents tend to have greater
freedeir cf action in foreign affairs than they have in
domestic business. However, even though the President can
invariably yet support for. his foreign policies, the prcnlem
cf finding viable policies is a very real one. As the
President comes to tie White House domestic policies are
fairly clearly laid cut by Party platforms, powerful
Congressmen whose suicort he relies upon, etc. Existing
domestic policies change only incrementally and the
President usually finds it easy to make small adjustments as
the political situations slowly alters. The international
environment, however, can change rapidly and unpredictably.
Any President knows he must support foreign aid to friendly
countries and long standing treaty commitments such as NATO,
tut sudden confrontations between two friendly nations, such
as England and Argentina in the Falkland Islands, create a
policy guancary.
Another reason the President has so much more
control over foreign versus domestic policy lies in the
evolution of the international structure since World .Jar II.
With the dismantling cf the great colonial empires, the
number cf sovereign nations has more than tripled. In addi-
tion to the sheer complexity of maintaining diplomatic rela-
tions with such large numbers, the world has become a much
more dangerous place.
The ever-present possibility of thermonuclear war is
a constant concern of the President. But the chance cf a
Soviet-American nuclear war, while catastrophic in its
conseguences, does not in itself contribute to the new
complexity cf international relations. Events in
47
Afghanistan, for exanple, axe important to the United States
because they are part of a larger global power struggle. Ihe
Soviet Union and the United States are in constant competi-
tion for the support cf smaller nations. The background of
this relationship was sketched in Chapter 1.
In the context of that power struggle, shrewd
leaders cf small and apparently inconsequential countries
can play the superpowers against each other and the conse-
guences cf action by lesser powers can be worldwide. Libya's
claim of the Gulf of Sydra as territorial water is in itself
a small matter, but the implications of such an action, if
unchallenged, are enormous. In a nation with vital interests
in the free navigaticn of international shipping, such as
the United States, tie highest levels of the government will
be focused en resolving the prcblem. Thus a primitive
country like Libya will draw the attention of the President
all cut cf proporticn to the capability of Libya to actually
do harm to the United States. In addition to the principles
of international law involved in the case, Libya is heavily
supported by the Soviet Union, increasing the importance cf
this ctherwise obscure country on the international scene,
with a ccrresponding increase in the amount of time the
President will devote to it.
lailures in demestic policy may hurt the President,
but failures in the international arena may critically
damage Aierican interests or even result in the destructicn
cf the nation. Presidents realize this and, as a result,
foreign policy concerns tend to drive out domestic policy.
Additionally, foreign policy decisions are often perceived
to be irreversible 53 and as a commitment of future genera-
tions. In short, because of the stakes involved in
53 "lhe I wo Presidencies"
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international affairs, Presidents will dedicate much ircre cf
their tine and political resources to them.
"If decisions are perceived to be both important and
irreversible, there is every reason for Presidents tc devcte
a great deal of resources to them. Presidents have to
oriented toward the future in the use of their resources.
They served a fixed term in office, and they cannot automat-
ically ccunt on support from the populace, Congress, cr the
administrative apparatus. They have to be careful, there-
fore, to husband their resources for pressing future needs.
Eut because the consequences of events in foreign affairs
are potentially more grave, faster to manifest themselves,
and less easily reversible than in domestic affairs,
Presidents are mere willing to use up their resources." 54
C. POBIIC CPIUICN
1 . Opi nio n as a .Concept
Opinion, as a concept, has had a remarkably
successful career. An opinion is a belief held with convic-
tion, but net necessarily substantiated by fact. The guality
of an opinion is often determined by the strength with which
it is held rather thai the validity of its logic.
Kith the rise of representative democracies in the
late eighteenth century, opinion acquired a great power,
especially when preceeded by the word "public." Putlic
opinion guickly began to dominate the democratic political
landscape, rarticulaily in the United States. Few politi-
cians dare question its wisdom. Since Thomas Jefferson,
Presidents have paid obligatory homage to Public Opinion.
As mass communications came into being, so too came
mass-production and mass-marketing, with the attendant need
to knew the preferences of the consuming public. Out of
this need grew the opinion pells, which guickly found their
way frcm the business of business to the business cf poli-
tics. In the present day, public opinion seems to be a know-




kith its ostensibly scientific trappings, public opinion has
acquired enormous prestige. While an individual opinion, no
matter hew knowledgatle or experienced the individual, is
still seen as slightly disreputable, public opinion, being
the opinion of no one in particular, is amove reproach.
An error inherent in public opinion polling is the
assumption that the opinion of the public can be treated as
the expression of the interests of The People as a histor-
ical community. This assumption is false. The People are not
merely the aggregate cf living persons in the nation at a
given time. The People includes past and future generations
as well, and thus is constantly in flux. The People, cited
in the Ccntitution of the United States on June 2 1, 1788,
had changed before the ink had dried on that document. Fifty
years later The People had changed dramatically; one hundred
years later, completely. ss
Public opinicn, as measured via voting booths and
cpinicn rolls, is entitled to some representation in the
government. But Public Opinion should be taken for what it
is and nothing more. It is not a statement of the national
interest- It is the opinion cf a plurality of the voters at
a given time. That a plurality of people think in a given
way or held a certain opinicn has no bearing on that opin-
ion's efficacy as sound public policy.
"The unhappy truth is that the prevailing public
cpinicn has been destructuvely wrong at the critical junc-
tures. The people have imposed a veto upon the judgment of
informed and responsitle officials. They have compelled the
governments, which usually knew what would have been wiser.
cr was necessarv, or was more expedient, to be too late with
too little, or too leng with too much, too pacifist in peace
and too rellicose in war, too neutralist or appeasing in
negotiation or too intransigent. Mass opinion has acquired
mounting power in this century. It has shown itself to be a
dangerous master of decisions when the stakes are life and
death. "s 6
55The_Public Philosophy, p. 3 2 -3
6
s «Ibid-, p. 24
50
^ . Operational Public Opinion
It is a tenet of American politics that major issues
attracting the intense interest of the electorate tend to he
domestic rather than foreign. s7 Yet punlic opinion is
frequently cited as an influence upon United States foreign
policy. How does public opinion affect actors in the plan-
ning and policymaking process?
Ihere are three theoretical models describing ways
elected cfficials shculd represent their constituencies
.
1- Ihe .Instructed Deleg ate, acting as a majority of his
constituents directs, regardless of his own views and
experience.
2- Ihe_5es possible, Part y_Memi3er , looking to his polit-
ical party for instruction. This model has somewhat
limited utility in the American foreign policy
process because of the 2/3 vote reguired for treaty
ratification (a 2/3 majority in the Senate by cne
pclitical party is a very rare tiling in American
pclitics) . Additionally, the two major American
pclitical parties tend to blur at the center and
there has existed a long standing tradition cf
bi-partisanship in foreign affairs.
3« The, Burkean Rcle, based on the theory of Edmund
Burke, a member of the Eritish Parliament in the late
eighteenth century. Burke argued that a representa-
tive should pursue his constituents* best interests,
net he merely the puppet of their will. The represen-
tative should not be a slave to public opinion, but
rather use his greater abilities and access to facts
tc act responsibly for his people.
57 Hughes # B.E.< Ihe Dom estic Context of America n f o reign
Policj, (San Franciscc: "Freeman, ITTBY , p. T2
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Individual Congressmen and Senators will see them-
selves acting in one or more of these roles depending
largely en which issue they are racing. In domestic politics
they desire at least tc appear to acting in the instructed
delegate and/or responsible party member role. In foreign
affairs most responsitle officials see themselves as playing
a Burkear rcle. Even when acting in the Burkean model,
representatives, including the President, desire to appear
to be responsive to their constituents' wishes. Thus purlic
cpinici can and does have an effect on foreign policy.
Ihe effect oi attentive publics and interest gicups
en policymaking and planning can be substantial. What the
President perceives public opinion to be on a policy issue
influences his action. More expicitly, what he perceives to
be the public reaction to proposed policy (s) influences his
estimate of the probatle effectiveness of that policy, and
the effect that public reaction to one policy may have en
ether policies and programs he is pursuing.
Ihe election of Richard Nixon in 1968 is an example,
looking at President Kixon 1 s past, one would have expected
him tc have been a hardliner in Vietnam, to reject negotia-
tions with the communists, and to resist any appearance of
appeasement. To do so would have been to continue the poli-
cies of the Johnson administration in Vietnam. Opposition to
the war had grown great enough by 1968 that merely contin-
uing those policies would have been disastrous, let alone
trying tc escalate the conflict to put more pressure on the
communists. President Nixon modified his own policy prefer-
ences to defuse the opposition to the war somewhat while
maintaining credibility with his conservative power base.
Ihe result was the " Kixon Doctrine", also known as
"Vietcamization. " American forces were gradually withdrawn
while South Vietnamese forces were improved qualitatively.




58 The attentive public opposing the war did net
get all it wanted, but undoubtedly exerted strong influence
en the Presidents action regarding Vietnam.
The pericd between World Wars I and II more broadly
illustrates some of the dangerous influences of mass opinion
on foreign policy-
Following World War I there was almost unanimous
opinion in western democracies that professional diplomats
had largely caused tie war. The effect of this feeling,
still in existence today, has been to force political
leaders to reduce the role of diplomatic professionals and
to assume most of these duties themselves. Instead of
allowing chiefs of missions abroad to do the work for which
they have spent their entire careers in tne Foreign Service
Corps preparing, Presidents and Secretaries of State have
consistertly attempted to conduct foreign diplomacy either
by telephone or by traveling themselves to the area of
concern. There are several principle problems associated
with this practice:
1. Presidents and Secretaries are very busy men. They
have not spent enough time learning all the intrica-
cies at play in the negotiations at hand, and they do
net have that time now.
2- Telephone conversations and face-to-face encounters
with foreign heads of state allow little opportunity
for reflection. Combined with the imprecise chance
exchanges that lurk in such meetings, many factors
work against satisfactory pursuit of national inter-
ests there.
3. Meeting at such a high level convey the impression
that vital national interests are at stake. The
impression is often false, but since it exists, the
58 Hilsman, R., Tfce Politics of Polic y Making in Defense
and Foreign Affairs, TNew YdTRz Harper and" Row, T97"If F- "TO^
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political costs of failure are raised significantly.
Ihere is a palpable increase in the impetus the
secure some kind of agreement, oxten at the expense
cf lcng-range interests.
Kith the emphasis on officials at the highest levels
conducting inter Eaticcal diplomacy came a change in the
format of these meetings. Diplomatic proceedings went
public- "Open covenants openly arrived at" is the legacy of
Woodrcw Viilson. Diplomacy by conference is the offspring cf
that legacy and the publicity that attends such conferences
ensures that they will be fruitless at best, and more prob-
ably harmful to the democratic, open societies involved.
large conferences, such as Munich in 1938, or Strategic Arms
Seduction Talks todaj, have satisfied the prerequisite for
openess with a vengeance and are doomed to fail before the
delegates even shake hands. All conferences begin by the
heads of the delegations making public statements on their
positions and objectives. Once such statements are made with
such high visibility, any concession to the opposition is
seen as a retreat, politically impossible for most leaders.
Agreement is precluded from the onset because no compromise
is possible. No real negotiation can take place in the
stifling atmosphere cf continuous press intrusions.
Ihis breakdown of international diplomacy, attribu-
table to the influence of ottrusive Public Opinion through
an over-zealous Press, is one of the most distrubing
phenomena of twentieth century international relations.
This certainly is a time when effective communication
between powerful adversaries is essential.
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V- THE NATIONAL INTEREST
The concept of tie national interest is central to the
strategic planning prccess. Policies are drawn up and imple-
mented in its name; it is invoked whenever American forces
are committed and lives put at risk. Defining and identif-
ying national interests is a harrowing and difficult task,
tut vital to the plaining process. How can the nation's
resources re committed to an idea whicn seemingly defies
definition? This chapter will attempt to shed some light on
this elusive concept as well as explore some of its uses for
the strategic planner-
A. AffRCACBES TO DEFINITION
Icr centuries the concept of national interest was seen
only in terms of power politics. The American Revolution v»as
something of a watershed in national interest theory with
the idea of moral principle rather than strict pursuit of
power guiding national policy. The competition between moral
law and power politics produced three types of American
statesmen: the realists, the idealists, and the moralists.
1 . Sealis ts
The realist school of the national interests is
personified .by Alexander Hamilton. Thinking and acting in
terms cf cower politics are its tenets. United States
foreign jolicy was structured along those lines during the
first decades of its existence (as long as the Federalists
held sway) . An example of American realist behavior is the
war cf tie first Coalition in 1793.
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Ihe War ex the First Coalition pitted Austria,
Prussia, Sardinia, Great Britain, and the United Netherlands
against France. Ihe United States was bound to France by a
treaty of alliance. Moral principles such as faithfulness to
treaty ctligations, gratitude to France for her assistance
during the Eevoluticnary War, and affinity to a fellow
republic were advanced as arguments for American entry into
the war en the French side. On April 22, 1793, Washington
issued a proclamation of neutrality. Alexander Hamilton
defended the proclamation very simply:
"....Self-preservation is the first duty of a nation;"
"It may he affirmed as a general principle, that the
predominant motive of good offices from one nation tc
another, is the interest or advantage of the nation which
performs them.
Indeed, the rule of morality in this respect is not
precisely the same between nations as between individuals,
ihe duty of making its own welfare the guide of its actions,
is much stronger upon the former than upon the latter; in
proportion to the greater magnitude and importance of the
national as compared with individual happiness, and tc the
greater permanency of the effects of national than of indi-
vidual conduct. Existing millions, and for the most part
future generations, are concerned in the present measures of
a government: while the consequences of the private actions
of an individual ordinarily terminate with himself, or are
circumscribed within a narrow compass."
"....our interference is not likely to alter the
case; it would only serve prematurely to exhaust our
strength. "59
Hamilton clearly put the question of honoring this treaty
obligation in concrete power terms. What were the risks
and/or advantages of joining France against the rest of
Europe? In this context the national interest was clearly
not served ty fulfilling the terms of the treaty, and moral
principle was trampled under political reality.
59£ucted in Morgenthau, H-J-. "The Mainsprings of
American Foreign Policy: The National Interest vs. Moral
Abstractions", The Anerican Political Science Quarterly,(Decemter, 1950r7~p7~"ETJT=BiT"3
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2 . Idealists
The overt realism desribed above did not survive the
turn cf the century. Washington's Farewell Address is its
final classic expression. Beginning with the administration
of Ihcmas Jefferson, realistic power politics has teen cver-
layed with ideals and moral principles. Political action
became scmewhat divorced from political thought and moral
laws were used to justify political ends. Jefferson himself
believed
"We are firmly convinced, and we act on that conviction,
tnat with naticns, as with individuals, our interests
soundly calculated, will ever be inseparable from cur
moral cuties." 60
Yet even in his policies as president
"....the moral pretense yielded often, especially in
private utterance, to the impact of the national
interest upon native good sense." 61
Nineteenth century American statemen, like
Jefferson, saw national interests as moral principles;
acting in terms cf pcwer, thinking in terms of morality.
Manifest Destiny was seen as saving the Indians frcm them-
selves by "civilizing" them and converting them to
Christiacity, rather than as the unrelenting conguest it
really was. Combined with the utter military inferiority cf
the Indians, which tended to obscure the traditional power
elements of this policy, Manifest Destiny was a crusade with
(ostensibly) few of the hallmarks of old-fashioned European
power projection and colonization.
60Jefferson, T. , "Second Inaugural Address," March 4,
1805, in Peterson, M.I-* ed., The Portable Thcmas Jefferscn,
(Middlesex: Penguin, 1980)
61 "Ihe Mainsprings of American Foreign Policy"
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3 . Moralists
At the conclusion of tie Spanish-American War a
second major shift occurred in American leadership's
thinkiiy on the national interest. As the war ended, the
status of the Philippine Islands was in question. President
McKinley had no precedent in American history to guide him
as to their disposition. During the previous century
American national interest had centered on taming Nortn
America, establishing and maintaining the United States as
the dcnirant power in the western hemisphere, and main-
taining a balance of power among the European powers.
McKinley 's decision tc annex the Philippines was unprece-
dented in that it was based on moral principles unrelated to
national interests. 62 Moral principle is no longer used tc
justify policies in pursuit of the national interest; the
former replaces the latter altogether.
Ihis approach to the national interest is personi-
fied in Wocdrow Wilson. Wilson's dedication to moral prin-
ciple was so profound that he found the concept of national
interest repugnant on moral grounds.
"It is a very perilous thing to determine the foreign
policy of a nation in the terms of material interest. It
not only is unfair to those with whom you are dealing,
but it is degrading as regards your own actions... We
dare net turn from the principle that morality and not
expediency is the thing that aust guide us, and that we
will never condone iniquity recause it is most conven-
ient tc do so. " 6 3
62McKmley decid€d it would be "the right thing tc do."
Wilson wculd develop a more elaborate moral/intellectual
base.
^Wilscr, w. , Address given at Mobile, Alabama, October
27, 1S13, guoted in "Ihe Mainsprings of American Foreign
folicy" fa a
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Wilson cculd not escape the national interest but
his reguirenent for moral principles in foreign policy led
to many problems during and after World War I. As previously
stated, maintenance cf a balance of power in Europe was a
traditional American interest. As Kaiser Wilnelm's Germany
threatened to successfully upset that balance it became
imperative for the United States to join with the Allies in
crder tc prevent that. Unable to see this for what it was
(i.e. pursuit of a national interest) , Wilson saw the danger
Germany posed in moral terms. In his eyes, it was vital fcr
the Onited States to enter the war to "make the world safe
for democracy" and that this would be the "war to end all
wars." further he saw the traditional balance of power
system in Europe as the root cause of the calamity. Thus,
the purpose of victory in Europe was not the restore/create
a viable balance among great powers, but rather to destroy
the system cf balances of power completely. 64
Wilsonian moialism, when faced with hard-headed
European statesmen pursuing their national interests, was
doomed. Enccmpromising moral principles are singularly cut
cf place in international negotiations where compromise is a
fundamental process. Morality grows in a cultural context,
and when different cultures attempt to deal with each ether
en moral teims, cognitive dysfunctions are sure to result.
In failing to consider the national interests of both former
allies and enemies, the United States effectively abdicated
her respcnsibilties and so lost an opportunity for estah-
lishing a safer and mere stable Europe, future historians
will undoubtedly see World Wars I and II as one Great War.
Wilsonian moialism submerged during the isolationist
period cf the 1920's and 1930's, but as internationalism
grew in the late 1930's, it did so in moralistic terms.
64n Ihe Mainsprings of American Foreign Policy", f. £49
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Although American involvement in World War II was much
greater than in World War I, the political results of the
application of morality to international politics were
depressingly familial.
"The practical results of this philosophy of interna-
tional affairs, as applied to tne political war and
?ost-war problems, were, then, bound to be quite similar
o those which had made the allied victory in the First
World War politically meaningless. Conceived as it was
as a 'crusade* — tc borrow rrom tne title of General
Eisenhower's book — against the evil incarnate in the
Axis Powers, the purpose of the Second World War could
only re the destruction of that evil, transacted through
the instrumentality of 'unconditional surrender.' Since
the threat to the western world emanating from the Axis
was conceived primarily in moral terms, it was easy to
imagine that all conceivable danger was concentrated in
that historic constellation of hostile powers and that
with its destructici political evil itself would disap-
pear from the world. Beyond 'unconditional surrender'
there was, then, a rrave new world after the model of
Wilscr's, which would liguidate the heritage of the
defeated evil, not 'peace-loving' nations and would
establish an order or thing where war, aggressiveness,
and the struggle fcr power itself were to be no more.
Thus Mr. Cor&ell Hull would declare on his return in
1945 from the Mosccw Conference that the new interna-
tional organization would mean the end of power politics




World War II thus was fought, just as World War I had teen,
to do away with the ralance of power. Only two snrewed
statesmen realized tie inefficacy of this approached and
worked tc establish a post-war balance favorable to their
rational interests. Cne, Stalin, succeeded; the other,
Churchill, did net.
4. Eel ati vism
i
y. Absol utism
The categories of American statemen described arove
can also be seen as actors in a struggle between an absolute
approach tc defining national interests and a relativistic
one. The Moralists can be termed political Absolutists;




ment cf strategic vision bat hammered its inplementaticri as
practical policy. The Realists and Idealists are more rela-
tivistic, though not exclusively. While possessing lcng
range interests and seme absolutes ("Lire , Liberty, and tne
Pursuit cf Happiness") , they are pragmatists when faced with
reai-wcrld operational dilemmas. The American historical
experience is predominately relativistic, particularly so in
the past fifty years. In a democratic environment ad hoc •
decision making tends to beccme the rule, and the national
interest changes as the political situation changes.
In totalitarian societies people are ordered to do
the unpleasant but necessary duties associated with vital
national interests. In democracies the term "Public
Interest" is often used to motivate populations to do things
they are reluctant tc do and tc justify unpopular policies.
This use of the concept may be viewed cynically:
"There is perhaps no better example on all language
of the utility of myth than the phrase 'the public
interest.' It is the talm of the official conscience. It is
cil en the troubled waters of public discontent. It is one
of society's most effective analgesics. But to have this
phrase serve this purjese over time, public servants must be
able to give it a rational content anchored in widely shared
value assumptions. The more that a society is built upon
consent rather than upon threat and constraint the mere tris
is true. Happily for colicy makers, the public os often
c,uite easily satisfied. I have watched fence-mending
congressnen explain with astounding success an unpopular
vote singly by leading untutored constituents down a garden
rath rich witn flowers marked 'fair,' 'just,' 'decent,'
*good.' 'brave,' 'clean,* 'reverent.' Tne most discouraging
aspect of tctalitariarism is not the power lust of its
leaders, tut the ease with whicn peopie adjust to losses in
political freedom when that loss is explained in terms cf
public necessity." 66
or philosophically;
66 Eailey, S.K., "Ihe Public Interest: Some Operational
Dilemmas," contained in Friedrich, C. J., ed., The Putlic
Interest, (New York: Atherton, 19t>2), p. 97
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"These natural and necessary duties have to do with the
defense and advancement abroad of the vital interests of
the state and with its order, security, and solvency at
home. InvariaDly these duties call for hard decisions.
They are hard because the governors of the state must
tax. conscript, conmand, prohibit; they must assert a
public interest against private inclination and against
what is easy and popular. If they are to do their duty,
they nust oxten sain against the tides of private
f eelinc. " 67
5 - National_Interest as_Process
In their attempts to define national interests some
scholars have limited themselves to simple, easily perceived
symptoms of national health such as defense of the homeland,
economic well-being, favorable world order, and promotion of
national ideology. 68 Ibis approach is emotionally satisfying
hut epistemclogically void. It is of little help in opera-
tionally defining the national interest.
A more effective method is to investigate the
public/national interest as a process of legitimization.
Professor Frank leti described this process as involving the
cybernetic linkage of three sets of variables: 69
1« She, Cultural Context , composed of ' the epis temclocical
procedures and assumptions which comprise cultural
identity. Over time those assumptions become institu-
tionalized, providing the defining characteristics of
a given polity.
2- The .Problematic S ituation, which is simply the situ-
ation in which the leadership finds itself, and the
problems it is attempting to solve. The problematic




, p . 15
6e Nuechterlein, E.E., National Interests and
Presidential Leadership: TEe~?eI"£rng of'PnoriTie s,
(Eoula'er: TJesTview, 13T5J
~
69Teti, F.M., "The Public Interest: In Search of an
Operational Definition", (Monterey, 1983).
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immediately dangerous that ad hoc methods seem tc he
the only viable means of coping, a dangerous proce-
dure .
"Conceptions or the national or public interest
must refer tc a given context ana, to this
extent, the national interest is a product of
context ualisji- .. .If one judges the veracity of
political acts solely in terms of the problematic
situation, excluding from consideration the
cultural context, one would be subscribing tc ad
hoc methods «hicn would be unatle either to
achieve legitimaticn in the immediate or provide
continuity for the future." 70
3- The Decision_f
x
ocess , several aspects of which were
described in chapter 2. The decision process of a
nation tends tc reflect its political and cultural
philosophy- In the United States philosophical
commitment to a high level of political and cultural
pluralism is reflected in the long, drawn-out deci-
sion making processes which characterize the national
government, the federal tudget being an excellent
example.
Ihis approach to defining the national interest,
while not providing explicit statements of American national
interest, has the merit of universal application. Its compo-
nents change constantly, making scientific equations of
rational interest difficult. Eut precisely for this reason
it allows construction of models which tetter reflect the
real world and are mere operationally viable than simple
statements such as Nuechter lein' s. By approaching the
national interest conceptually, operationalization may te
realized. Particularly as the cultural context changes, the
national interest itself will be altered. Clearly the
rapidly changing demographic complexion of the United States




interests. A thorough understanding of this process ry stra-
tegic planners and policymakers may make that inevitable
evolution of societal values a healthy process for this
ration.
B. lYiZS Of NATIONAI INTERESTS AND THEIB USES
Even if the concept of the national interest defies
static operational definition, its existence as an influence
upon/tccl of policymakers is beyond dispute. Delineating
some tasic types of interests may throw some additioral
light on the meaning of the term.
There are three broad categories of interests which may
he involved in a given problematic situation. 71
1 • Self-Regarding Interest s — refers to tasic issues of
national survival and prestige. George and Kechane
further refine self- regarding interests through the
use of irreducible national interests containing
"tasic" and "secondary" self-regarding interests.
These basic self-regarding interests are defined as:
a) Physical Survival — referring to survival of the
nation's peculation
b) liberty — referring to the freedom of a people to
choose their own form of government.
c) Economic Sutsistence — some Einimuni level of
general welfare which is essential to the legiti-
macy of all modern governments, as well as being
an important element of national power.
2- the r-R eg ardirg_Inte rests, referring to benefits
accruing to other nations as the result of one's own
national policy.
7l Gecrge, A.I. , and Keohane, R.O., "The Concept of
National Interests: Dses and limitations," in George, A. I.
,
££es i dentia l D ec isior caking in F oreiu n_P ol icy : The Eff e ctive
2§_e_oI_Tnf crjoa^i cn_and31jTvi ce, T"B"oa~Iaer : West view, 7"9"8~0J~~
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3. Collective Interests, when senefits are clearly
visitle but camot be distinguished as exclusively
belonging to cue nation. The North Atlantic Treaty
Organization is an example of collective interests
being served, where western European countries mutu-
ally benefit ret only from the military security
arrangement but also frcm an ordered economic system
allowing substantially free trade.
While irreducible self- regarding interests are seemingly
uncompetitive in their impact on policymakers, in fact they
have often introduced a dilemma into American foreign policy
as illustrated below.
Since World War II there has existed among American
Presidents and their policy advisors a concensus concerning
the two primary threats to American irreducible national
interests. These are the spread of international communism
and the possibility cf thermonuclear war. One objective has
been tc counter both these dangers; but firm pressure en one
often increases the probability of the other. For example,
to have aided the British and French during the Suez Crisis
of 1956 would have almost certainly unseated Nasser and
given Soviet influence in Egypt a severe setback, 72 tut
would have drastically increased the threat of World War
III. likewise, by steadfastly avoiding possibilities cf
war, such as accepting a blatant communist coup in Grenada
(with its strategic position on shipping lanes vital tc
American foreign trade) without decisive response, would
facilitate the spread cf communism.
Self-regarding interests obviously will tend to dominate
planning and policymaking, particularly in a time of crisis.
Alliances are nice, but in an anarchical international
setting, leaders must look first to their own national
72 Neustadt, R.E.. Alliance Politi cs, (New York
Columria, 1S70J, p. 5-29
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survival- Ihe intensity of the problematic situation imrues
levels oi intensity upon perceptions of national interests.
C. IKTEBSI1IES
Assessing the intensity of the national interest
involved in the problematic situation is a vital step in
planning a nation's ccurse of action.
"For example, a government may be deeply concerned atcut
a ccup d'etat in a friendly country, but the intensity
of its ccrcern will depend on several factors, such as
distance from its cwn borders, composition of its
government, the amcunt of trade ana investment that
exists there, and historical relationships. Policymakers
must also look at the potential costs of attempting tc
counter an unfavoratle event or trend in another ccuntry
— fcr example, the effectiveness of various policy
options in changing the course of events, and risks of
war. Thus, the degree of interest the United States, cr
any major power, has in a specific international issue
results from thinking through the values and costs
perceived to be invclved in coping with the issue." 73
Professor Nuechterlein outlines four valuable levels of
intersit j;
1" Survival Issues — The continued existence of the
state is at stake. Military attack on national terri-
tory, or the prospect of imminent attack, is clearly
a survival issue. Of the types of interests discussed
above, only tie irreducible self-regarding interest
of physical survival qualifies for this intensity.
The immediate threat of massive harm is present.
2- Vital Issues — Strong measures, including employment
of military fcrces, may be necessary to deal with the
problematic situation. A vital issue may have the
capacity to be equally injurious to a nation as a
survival issue, but its effect is over a longer term.
Ihe prospect of a communist controlled Grenada
7 3 National_interest s an d Presiden tial Leadership, p. 8
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perched on important American sea lines of
ccmmunica tion was deemed to threaten vital United
States' interests and decisive action was taken to
correct the prchlem. The prospect of another hostage
crisis a la 1S80 also lent vital intensity to the
Grenada situation.
3. Major Issue s — major issues are characterized by
adverse trends in the international environment which
reguire positive action before they escalate to vital
or survival issues. Major issues are almost invari-
able resolved through negotiation and normal avenues
of diplomatic intercourse; if the issue cannot be
resolve through these means, either or both countries
involved will re-assess their interest in the issue.
If important enough, the issue become vital. If
either actor decides that the matter in question is
net worth the risks involved in settling vital
issues, the case is probably a peripheral issue.
4. Peripheral Issues — the well-being of the state is
not involved in the issue at hand, but special groups
within the state have interests at stake. Drastic
action by the national government is not called for
and will not be forthcoming in a peripheral issue.
lie utility to the planner of these intensity levels
lies in the framework they provide for anticipating the
actions of other nations when their interests are threatened
by American actions. Ihis does not imply the avoidance of
conflict, but if a United States policy can be seen as
encroaching upon a vital interest of another state, it will
not be surprised by the hostile reaction which results. If
the United States' advance into North Korea during the
Korean war had been seen as threatening a vital Chinese
interest, American leaders would not have been caught
unawares when the Chinese crossed the border in large
67
numbers. Consideration of the current and potential adver-
saries 1 interests in such a Situation should be a component




Ecr tie past one and one-half centuries political
observers have questioned whether the American political
system, with its institutional fragmentation, is capable cf
meeting the demands ci international relations. For most of
this period it has been adequate. Events developed much
more slowly and the United States eitner too weak to be a
serious force in international politics (up until World War
I) or toe disinterested (the inter-war years) . Only since
World War II, when America assumed tne inevitable role cf
world leadership, has the structure and procedure of govern-
ment teen seriously called into question. The question is
still being asked: Can the United States, given its frag-
mented governmental structure and the impatient character of
its people, survive sustained international conflict short
cf total war?
The prevailing opinion seems to be that it cannot, at
least not in its original Madisonian structure. Some modifi-
cation to the model has been necessary. Thus since 1945
Presidents have acquired greater and greater power, reaching
a peak during the Vietnam War. The structure of the govern-
ment was not fundamentally altered, but the relative impor-
tance of the actcrs changed. Hamiltonian centralization of
power was assumed to te the cure for excessive Madisonian
fragmentation. In the nation at large, the federal govern-
ment has dominated the States to an extent which would have
horrified Madison; within the federal government, the
President has generally assumed dominance over the Congress.
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It is important to recall that foreign policy concerns
led tc the "Imperial Presidency." The demands of modern
international relations are too great for a government
structured along the Madisonian divisions of authority- This
is net a criticism of Madison. He conceived this government
in a time cf intense domestic crisis, as the failure cf tie
Articles cf Confederation threatened to reduce the fledgling
United States of Ameiica to anarchy. His model is intended
to ensure domestic order and personal freedom based en
balances cf power within the government. It has proven
remarkably flexible and contains built-in evolutionary mech-
anisms. Eut it was never designed for the global leadership
role which the United States plays today. The age of nuclear
heopens and instantaneous mass-communication has strained it
perhaps to the breaking point.
Ihe Madisonian mcdel still has a lot of life in it. It
does impose many constraints which work against conherence
and continuity in foreign policy. But the constraints are
knowable. This thesis has briefly examined the constitu-
tional stucture and the processes of compromise and
consensus attendant tc it, the impact of mass media and
public opinion on foreign policy, the defense budget, and
the interests and influence of the President. When these
factors are ignored by planners and policymakers, failure is
the certain result.
Systemic change is unlikely. The impatient nature cf
the American people, fueled by its press, is even more
resistant to change. Thirty minutes of nightly news, daily
public opinion polls, etc. rob time for reflection. Ihe
media requirement for daily triumphs and daily failures
(perceived cr real) exacerbates that natural American impa-
tience, lenacity and perseverance, vital to coherent policy,
are its victims.
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E. TEE flIIITABY PLAUBEB
Cne cf the most prominent features of the military
establishment in Washington, apart from its sheer size, is
its extraordinary weakness. A full discussion of this weak-
ness is not within the scope of the thesis, but part of it
lies the credibility gap between military planners and their
political overlords. Military participation in the national
security planning process must be more than merely the
construction of worst case scenarios. Military planners have
a responsibility to themselves and their superiors to tell
them when the political objective can not be achieved by
military means or where military force will have only
marginal utility while incurring great costs. They have an
e^ual responsibility to realistically plan for achievement
of political objectives. An elaborate command structure such
as the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (BDJIF) , now known
as the Central Command (CENICCM), is a noax played on the
American people and the American military. Structured
around a threat of tie greatest magnitude, namely a full-
scale Soviet invasion cf Iran designed to threaten or seiz-
ethe Eersiar Gulf oil fields, CENTCOM nas no forces
assigned. All planning has teen done on the assumption that
CENTCCM forces will be drawn from other, already committed
forces.
The problems with this planning are obvious. A Soviet
invasion of southwest Asia is not going to be an isolated
event. It is difficult to imagine a more grave crisis. The
likelihood cf forces committed to European and Asian thea-
ters heing transferred to CENICOM is extremely low in a time
cf such tension.
The forces do not exist for CENTCOM. The political
reality is that only the contingency for which they are
intended (Soviet invasion of Iran) could stimulate the
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political will necessary to create the requisite forces. Ey
the time they could be inducted, trained, and deployed, the
war would be over. Even if the United States had the forces
today, it lacks the air- and sealift capacity to get th€m in
theater. Ihe work of many dedicated planners thus goes for
nothing.
Most of the constraints discussed in this thesis are out
of military control. Ihe defense budget is not. The tudget
is the one area under discussion in this thesis which could
come under much stronger military influence. The budget,
through PPBS, has assumed a life of its own. Instead of
being a vital implement of national defense planning, it is
merely the aggregate cf program managers' inputs.
l£05I^lli£S -kas completely dominated Planning. The military
has ccntiacted its leadership out to civilian systems'
analysts. The Planning aspects of PP3S must be brought into
prominence. The system must be made to serve national goals,
not the goals of bureaucratic urderlings.
military power exists to secure the political objective.
This concept is alien to American ideology, but it is true
nevertheless. The CEMCOM example above is abhorrent to the
military professional. A political object has been assigned,
but the political will to achieve it is lacking. This is the
same dysfunction of ends and means which led to compromise
in Korea and defeat in Vietnam.
Ihe United States is not well served by a military
establishment which continues to say "can do" to all orders,
no matter hew preposterous. Military strategic planners
must net throw away their talents. They have an obligatioc
to the nation to better understand the environment in which
plans are translated into policies which become force struc-
tures. Strategic planning in the Pentagon is in vain if its
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